North Korea's Ambition to "Go Nuclear"

and Theoretical Resolutions for the Plausibility

Kil, Byung-ok

Professor, Faculty of Military Studies

Chungnam National University

It is the spread of nuclear weapons, many scholars agree, that imperils the international balance of power and global peace. This is so because the proliferation involves the most volatile nations, many of which have fought repeated wars with neighboring states and have highly unstable domestic political regimes.

Regarding the issue of proliferation and deterrence, two theoretical views are salient in that they contrast “a peaceful nuclear past” with “a fearful nuclear future.” A variety of scholars’ concerns, particularly those of nuclear pessimists, focus on the lack of applicability of distinctive sets of conditions that have maintained the long peace among nuclear states. Domestic instability and the political nature of the would-be proliferators, the lack of safety in command and control systems coupled with possible accidents or unauthorized launching, and greater risks of escalation to conventional or nuclear war, all constitute their primary concerns. The proliferation pessimists point out the lack of an alternative theory concerning the consequences of nuclear proliferation and argue that nuclear possession by conflicting powers and “rogue” states will increase the likelihood of war in the future.

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Another prominent theoretical view, that of nuclear optimism, is that proliferation is actually desirable for world peace and regional stability because it reduces the likelihood of war or aggression through a secure nuclear deterrence. Proliferation optimists maintain that the existence of nuclear weapons has enhanced sustainable peace through the deterrence strategy of mutually assured destruction(MAD), and have applied the “expected-utility assumptions of rational deterrence theory” to nuclear weapons states.

However, assuming that these two theoretical arguments are each logical, the problem to which we must attend is which explanation is more valid and more applicable to the post-Cold War world and in the Northeast Asian region. There as yet have been sufficient analytical and methodological frameworks that suggest plausible resolutions on the issue of nuclear proliferation in the case of North Korea.

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North Korea’s incentives to go nuclear stem from strategic isolation, economic crisis, and the security/insecurity dilemma. The North seems to be convinced of the benefits of a countervailing nuclear deterrent strategy to converge power capabilities. In the obtaining converging capabilities, nuclear weapons for North Korea provide a strategic equalizer in the face of disparity of total capability compared to the ROK-US military capability. In addition, it seems that the North uses the nuclear card as a bargaining chip for diplomatic recognition and economic aid by the West.

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Theoretical policy recommendations are two-fold: overt nuclear deterrent strategy through a formal declaration and covert nuclear deterrent strategy. The former would be effective to the extent that the North would not underestimate the ROK-US alliance capability, but this may accelerate the proliferation chain in the Northeast Asian region. The latter may be effective to halt nuclear proliferation in the region but may involve counter-proliferation and a situation where both Koreas become a target of preemptive strikes.

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North Korea’s dilemma resides in the difficulties it faces in choosing alternatives. Although the North’s increasing isolation makes political and economic reforms imperative, Pyongyang may have to keep the military-first policy for the nuclear-weapon-state status. Thus, South Korea should endeavor to persuade the North that going nuclear is against its interests for security and that it should open its economy to the outside world in order to overcome its economic crisis. Politically, the South’s policy against the North’s nuclear ambition should include as many ways as possible to contain and dismantle its nuclear program.

Many scholars argued that an implicit assumption about the viability of deterrence may not be applicable in most cases of proliferation. Thus, nuclear optimists have confused prescriptions of what rational states should do with predictions of what real states will do. The difficulty for rational deterrence theory is in knowing whether the adversary has actually been deterred. The difficulties in identifying what the specific threats to the adversary are, whether the adversary’s political decision-makers have reliable information, and whether they are rational and have humane intentions make the issue very complex.

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In conclusion, Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea’s nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world.

In order to effectively cope with the changes in the security environment and future warfares, South Korea needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology-intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region.